<div3 id="law-euclo-FN004-div3-32">
<titleGroup><title>
<p>
<enumerator altNum="s.(e)">(e)</enumerator>
<i>Refusal to Deal</i>
</p></title>
</titleGroup>
<div4 id="law-euclo-FN004-div4-32"><titleGroup>
<title>
<p>
<enumerator altNum="s.(i)">(i)</enumerator>
<i>Unilateral Refusals to Deal</i>
</p>
</title></titleGroup><div5 id="law-euclo-FN004-div5-52">
<titleGroup>
<title>
<p>
<i>General principles</i>
</p>
</title>
</titleGroup>
<div6 id="law-euclo-FN004-div6-52">
<p>
<enumerator role="paraNum" altNum="(4.170)">4.170</enumerator> In most EC Member
States, the legal order embodies the principles of a market economy and the freedom
to engage in business activities. A corollary of these principles is the freedom
granted to undertakings to deal with whomsoever they like. These principles are also
enshrined in EU competition rules. As the CFI has stated &#x02018;The case law
of the ECJ indirectly recognizes the importance of safeguarding free enterprise when
applying the competition rules of the Treaty where it expressly acknowledges that
even an undertaking in dominant position may, in certain cases, refuse to
sell&#x2026; without failing under the prohibition laid down in Article
82.&#x02019;<xrefGrp role="footnote">
<xref ref="law-euclo-FN004-note-004168">
<sup>168</sup>
</xref>
</xrefGrp>
</p>
<noteGroup>
<note id="law-euclo-FN004-note-004168" type="footnote">
<p>
<enumerator>
<sup>168</sup>
</enumerator> Case T-41/96 <bibItem id="law-euclo-FN004-bibItem-257" class="case-ref" party1="Bayer AG" party2="Commission" idnumber="[2000] ECR II-3383">
<i>Bayer AG v Commission</i>
[2000] ECR II-3383</bibItem>, para 180.</p>
</note>
</noteGroup>
</div6>
<div6>
<p>
<enumerator role="paraNum" altNum="(4.171)">4.171</enumerator> Freedom to deal is a
principle which, in addition to its legal and political nature, is also justified by
economic considerations. Indeed, ensuring that companies will be able freely to use
their assets and output fosters investment, innovation, and competition in the long
term. If companies knew in advance that they would normally be obliged to give
competitors access to their assets or output, for instance a facility that they have
built or a new production process that they have developed and patented, the
incentive to engage in such activities might be reduced.<xrefGrp role="footnote">
<xref ref="law-euclo-FN004-note-004169">
<sup>169</sup>
</xref>
</xrefGrp>
</p>
<noteGroup>
<note id="law-euclo-FN004-note-004169" type="footnote">
<p>
<enumerator>
<sup>169</sup>
</enumerator> See para 57 of Opinion of Advocate
General Jacobs in Case C-7/97 <bibItem id="law-euclo-FN004-bibItem-258" class="case-ref" party1="Oscar Bronner GmbH &#x00026; Co." party2="Mediaprint Zeitungs">
<i>Oscar Bronner GmbH &#x00026; Co. v
Mediaprint Zeitungs</i>
</bibItem>.</p>
</note>
</noteGroup>
</div6>
<div6>
<p>
<enumerator role="paraNum" altNum="(4.172)">4.172</enumerator> In view of the
above, the legal order would normally oblige a firm to deal against its will only in
those rare situations when it is necessary in order to protect a public interest. It
is clear from case law concerning the application of Article 82 that the refusal to
deal or the exercise of an exclusive right by the owner may involve abusive conduct
only in situations where there is particular harm to competition.</p>
</div6></div5><div5 id="law-euclo-FN004-div5-53">
<titleGroup>
<title>
<p>
<i>Elements of the abuse</i>
</p>
</title>
</titleGroup>
<div6 id="law-euclo-FN004-div6-53">
<p>
<enumerator role="paraNum" altNum="(4.173)">4.173</enumerator> The general
conditions that are necessary to establish an abusive refusal to
deal&#x02014;the conduct, the effects, and the absence of objective
justification&#x02014;are described in the following paragraphs. Afterwards,
each of these conditions is examined in greater detail for specific types of
refusals to deal.</p>
</div6>
<div6 id="law-euclo-FN004-div6-54">
<titleGroup>
<title>
<p>
<i>Conduct: refusal to deal</i>
</p>
</title>
</titleGroup>
<div7 id="law-euclo-FN004-div7-176">
<p>
<enumerator role="paraNum" altNum="(4.174)">4.174</enumerator> There is a wide
array of conduct that can be classified as refusal to deal. The following is a
non-exhaustive list of types of refusal that might be caught by Article 82:
refusal to supply products and services; refusal to provide information; refusal
to license intellectual property rights; refusal to grant access to an essential
facility; or refusal to become part of a network. A refusal to deal can,
obviously, take the form both of a refusal to start dealing, as well as of the
unilateral termination of an ongoing deal (eg a withdrawal of supply).</p>
</div7>
<div7 id="law-euclo-FN004-div7-177">
<p>
<enumerator role="paraNum" altNum="(4.175)">4.175</enumerator> The concept of a
refusal to deal covers not only the pure refusal, but also agreement by the
dominant company to deal but under unreasonable conditions. In this regard, price
and non-price conditions can be distinguished. As to the latter, the Commission
has acknowledged that non-refusal conditional upon acceptance of other unrelated
products or services could be considered an abuse.<xrefGrp role="footnote">
<xref ref="law-euclo-FN004-note-004170">
<sup>170</sup>
</xref>
</xrefGrp> An
obligation imposed by a dominant supplier to indicate the geographical destination
of the goods supplied and the identity of the final customers may also considered
an abuse of a dominant position.<xrefGrp role="footnote">
<xref ref="law-euclo-FN004-note-004171">
<sup>171</sup>
</xref>
</xrefGrp>
</p>
<noteGroup>
<note id="law-euclo-FN004-note-004170" type="footnote">
<p>
<enumerator>
<sup>170</sup>
</enumerator>
<bibItem id="law-euclo-FN004-bibItem-259" class="EUleg" title="Notice on the application of the EC competition rules to cross-border credit transfers" date="1995" idnumber="Official Journal (OJ)">Notice on the application of the EC competition rules to cross-border
credit transfers [1995] OJ</bibItem> para 26.</p>
</note>
<note id="law-euclo-FN004-note-004171" type="footnote">
<p>
<enumerator>
<sup>171</sup>
</enumerator>
<i>Polaroid/SSI Europe</i>, 13th Report on Competition Policy, paras
155&#x02013;157.</p>
</note>
</noteGroup>
</div7>
<div7 id="law-euclo-FN004-div7-178">
<p>
<enumerator role="paraNum" altNum="(4.176)">4.176</enumerator> Excessive prices,
as well as being abusive in themselves, may also amount to an effective
refusal<xrefGrp role="footnote">
<xref ref="law-euclo-FN004-note-004172">
<sup>172</sup>
</xref>
</xrefGrp> (see below a detailed analysis of the
concept of excessive prices). Finally, the Commission has acknowledged that undue
and inexplicable or unjustified delays in responding to a request for access may
also constitute an abuse.<xrefGrp role="footnote">
<xref ref="law-euclo-FN004-note-004173">
<sup>173</sup>
</xref>
</xrefGrp>
</p>
<noteGroup>
<note id="law-euclo-FN004-note-004172" type="footnote">
<p>
<enumerator>
<sup>172</sup>
</enumerator>
<bibItem id="law-euclo-FN004-bibItem-30" class="EUleg" title="Notice on the application of the Competition Rules to access agreements in the telecommunications sector" date="1998" idnumber="Official Journal (OJ)" legisNum="02">Notice on the
application of the Competition Rules to access agreements in the
telecommunications sector (1998) OJ C265/02, para 97</bibItem>.</p>
</note>
<note id="law-euclo-FN004-note-004173" type="footnote">
<p>
<enumerator>
<sup>173</sup>
</enumerator>
<bibItem id="law-euclo-FN004-bibItem-006" class="EUleg" title="Notice on the application of the Competition Rules to access agreements in the telecommunications sector" date="1998" idnumber="Official Journal (OJ)" legisNum="02">
<xrefGrp>
<xref ref="law-euclo-FN004-bibItem-30">ibid</xref>
</xrefGrp>
</bibItem>, para
95.</p>
</note>
</noteGroup>
</div7>
</div6>
<div6 id="law-euclo-FN004-div6-55">
<titleGroup>
<title>
<p>
<i>Effects: harm to competition</i>
</p>
</title>
</titleGroup>
<div7 id="law-euclo-FN004-div7-179">
<p>
<enumerator role="paraNum" altNum="(4.177)">4.177</enumerator> A refusal to deal
should only be covered by Article 82 when it harms competition in a particular
market. The market in question may be either the market where the dominant
undertaking is present (referred to as a primary line abuse) or any other market
(referred to as a secondary line abuse).</p>
</div7>
</div6></div5>
</div4>
</div3>